Partitioning and distributing deep neural networks (DNNs) over physical nodes such as edge, fog, or cloud nodes, could enhance sensor fusion, and reduce bandwidth and inference latency. However, when a DNN is distributed over physical nodes, failure of the physical nodes causes the failure of the DNN units that are placed on those nodes. The performance of the inference task will be unpredictable, and most likely, poor, if the distributed DNN is not specifically designed and properly trained for failures. Motivated by this, we introduce deepFogGuard, a method for making the distributed DNN inference task failure-resilient. To articulate deepFogGuard, we introduce the elements and a model for the resiliency of distributed DNN inference. Inspired by the concept of residual connections in DNNs, we introduce skip hyperconnections in distributed DNNs, which are the basis of deepFogGuard's design to provide resiliency. Next, our extensive experiments using two existing datasets for the state-of-the-art sensing and vision applications confirm the ability of deepFogGuard to provide resiliency for distributed DNNs in edge-cloud networks.
INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) applications, more smart IoT devices are being deployed and integrated into our daily routines. Smart homes, smart cities, wearables, self-driving vehicles, AR and VR, context sensing and crowdsensing, and smart retail are examples of adaptations of IoT devices into human spaces [33, 34] . To intelligently analyze and act on the data that IoT devices generate, machine learning (ML) techniques are seen to be promising. This is primarily because IoT devices are often directly connected to data sources, such as cameras, microphones, gyroscopes, or sensors that capture a large quantity of input data that could feed the ML models [2, 29] .
Due to their accuracy and powerful expressiveness, deep learning, among other ML techniques, has been a successful choice for IoT applications in a broad spectrum of domains such as computer vision, speech recognition, medical diagnosis, and natural language processing [17, 21] . Deep learning techniques make use of deep neural networks (DNNs). In certain DNN-empowered IoT applications, the inference task runs for a prolonged period of time. Examples of such IoT applications are image-based defect detection in a factory, automatic recognition of parts during product assembly, or anomaly behavior detection in a crowd based on DNNs [6] . Nevertheless, a challenge with DNN-empowered IoT applications is determining where the DNN model should be placed for the inference task.
The immediate option may be deploying DNNs directly onto the IoT devices; however, this is often infeasible, as many IoT devices are resource-constrained and cannot efficiently support the computational requirements of DNNs. For instance, according to Liu et al. [18] , the GoogleNet model for image classification is larger than 20 MB and requires about 1.5 billion multiply-add operations per inference per image.
Another possibility is to place the DNN in the cloud and send the IoT data to the cloud, since the cloud servers are equipped with powerful hardware such as TPUs and GPUs. Nevertheless, when a DNN is deployed in the cloud, the data has to be continuously transmitted from IoT devices to the cloud in WAN environments during inference, which results in the heavy consumption of network resources, high latency, and privacy concerns [18, 29] .
Another option for DNN placement is to distribute the DNN over physical nodes along an edge-fog-cloud hierarchy [9, 14, 18, 20, 28, 29] . The idea is to distribute the DNN onto edge nodes, fog nodes, and cloud nodes so that inference from IoT data is processed along the route, on different physical nodes from the edge to cloud.
A natural question that arises is whether the resulting distributed DNN inference along edge-fog-cloud is resilient in the presence of physical nodes failures. Specifically, the question is: what happens to an ongoing inference task of a distributed DNN when its physical nodes fail, and how can we make distributed DNN inference resilient to physical node failures? This question is the topic of our study.
When a DNN is distributed over physical nodes, failure of a physical node causes the failure of the DNN units that are placed on the node. Failure of physical nodes could be due to power outages, cable cuts, natural disasters, or hardware/software failures. The effect of such failures on distributed DNN inference may be heavily dependent on the time to recover from the failures.
During the time that physical nodes are being recovered, the performance of the distributed DNN inference is unpredictable, and most likely, poor, if the distributed DNN is not specifically designed and properly trained for failure resiliency. This is especially important for critical applications that cannot tolerate unpredictable and poor performance, even for a short time.
In this paper, we study the failure resiliency of distributed DNN inference over the edge, fog, and cloud nodes, where the failure of a physical node results in the failure of the DNN units that are placed on the node. Our main contributions in this paper are as follows (1) We introduce deepFogGuard, a method for making the distributed DNN inference failure-resilient. In order to provide context for deepFogGuard, we first introduce the elements and a model for the resiliency of distributed DNN inference. Inspired by the concept of residual connections in DNNs [13] , we introduce skip hyperconnections in distributed DNNs, which are the basis of deepFogGuard's design to provide resiliency. Residual connections skip one or more DNN layers, whereas skip hyperconnections skip one or more physical nodes. (2) We conduct extensive experiments using two existing data sets for state-of-the-art sensing and vision applications.
We confirm the ability of deepFogGuard to provide resiliency for distributed DNNs in edge-cloud networks. In deepFogGuard, upon failure of a physical node, the information flow can still be routed through the distributed DNN, thanks to the skip hyperconnections. Hence, we call the skip hyperconnections the Guardians of the Deep Fog, since they act as the guard of information flow in distributed DNNs over edge-fog-cloud hierarchy.
DEEPFOGGUARD DEFINITIONS
In this section we introduce the definitions required to articulate deepFogGuard and provide the necessary context.
Defining DNN
Consider a DNN with L hidden layers. Let l P t1, . . . , Lu index the hidden layers of the DNN. Let x pl q denote the vector of inputs into layer l and y pl q denote the vector of outputs from layer l. Similarly, W pl q P R d pl qˆd pl´1q and b pl q P R d pl q are the matrices of weights and vector of biases at layer l, respectively, where dplq is the dimension (number of units) of layer l.
A forward operation of a DNN layer is defined as
where дp¨q is a nonlinear activation function and y p0q is the DNN's input features. We next define the elements of distributed DNNs.
Defining Distributed DNN
We begin this subsection with the formal definition of partitioning and distributing DNNs. 
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Figure 1: Partitioning a DNN and distributing it across physical nodes v 1 and v 2 . The DNN is fully connected (not all weights are shown).
distributed over a set of physical nodes V . This operation and the resulting split DNN is denoted by G i u V .
The present study does not address the problem of optimal partitioning of the DNNs (i.e. finding an optimal partition map u), as it is not the primary focus of this paper. The optimal DNN partitioning is non-trivial and depends on many factors including available network bandwidth, type of DNN layers (convolutional vs. fully-connected), and DNN graph topology [9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 32, 35] . Instead, this article studies the resiliency of previously-partitioned distributed DNN models during inference (G V according to the definition below). Definition 2. Optimally partitioned DNN. If u˚denotes the optimal partition map (with regards to constraints such as delay, bandwidth, or energy), G V denotes the resulting optimally partitioned DNN according to u˚. Hence, G V " G i u˚V .
Physical Nodes vs. DNN Units:
To distinguish between physical nodes in the network and artificial nodes (neurons or units) in DNNs, we clarify by using units when referring to DNN neurons. Additionally, we only use the term physical node; however, the concepts in this study are also applicable to virtual nodes, such as VMs and containers.
Types of Physical Nodes: IoT devices (e.g. sensors, cameras, or mobile phones) are the main sources of data, whereas cloud servers are central hubs for processing and storage. Cloud servers are normally part of large data centers. On the other hand, fog nodes could host services packaged in the form of VMs, containers, or unikernels, and can be routers, switches, dedicated servers for fog computing (e.g. cloudlets), set-top boxes, access points, or firewalls. Similarly, edge nodes are devices attached to the connected things, such as WiFi access points, first-hop routers and switches, and base stations [34] . Figure 1 shows the process of splitting a DNN with four fullyconnected layers and distributing it across two physical nodes v 1 and v 2 . The layers l 1 and l 2 are stored on node v 2 and the layers l 3 and l 4 are stored on node v 1 . Note that a special layer l # 1 (called expansion layer) is included below layer l 3 in node v 1 . This layer is for the reception and the expansion of the vector of data from the other physical nodes (to be discussed). Since the distributed DNN resides on different physical nodes, during inference the vector of output values from one physical node must be transferred (e.g. through a TCP socket) to another physical node. We call the transfer link (pipe) between two physical nodes a hyperconnection.
Hyperconnections: Unlike a typical neural network that connects two units and transfers a scalar, a hyperconnection connects two physical nodes over which the layers of a DNN is distributed and transfers a vector of scalars.
Simple vs. Skip Hyperconnections: Hyperconnections are one of two kinds: simple or skip. A hyperconnection is called simple when it connects a physical node to the physical node that has the next DNN layer (i.e. "parent" node in the hierarchy), and is called skip when it skips one or more physical nodes in the hierarchy and connects a physical node to an "ancestor" node. In Fig. 1 , the simple hyperconnection between v 1 and v 2 connects the output values of layer l 2 to the input of expansion layer l # 1 . The skip hyperconnection connects the output of a "descendant" physical node v j (not shown) to the input of expansion layer l # 1 . The concept of skip hyperconnection is similar to that of residual connections in DNNs [13] . Residual connections are a special case of highway connections [13, 27] and are those connections skipping one or more DNN layers. Similarly, skip hyperconnections skip one or more physical nodes in a distributed DNN. deepFogGuard makes use of skip hyperconnections for added resiliency, so that upon failure of a physical node, the information flow can still be routed to the cloud for inference. In Section 3 we explain that adding skip hyperconnections improves resiliency of the distributed DNN.
Remark: Note that the weights that feed the unit output values of physical node v 2 to the hyperconnection (vector w2 ) and the weights that expand the output of the Add operation to the expansion layer of physical node v 1 (vector w _ 1 ) are all set to 1. The value of these vectors can be chosen arbitrarily because DNNs learn to adjust and compensate their weights during training. For simplicity but without loss of generality, we assume the value of 1 for these vectors.
Hyperconnection Weights: Similar to connection weights in neural networks, a hyperconnection may also have a weight vector; the elements of the vector that passes through the hyperconnection are multiplied by this weight. Let vector w i j denote the hyperconnection weight that connects physical node v i to physical node v j . In this study, @i, j w i j " 1, that is the weight of all hyperconnections is chosen to be the vector 1 (a vector with all elements equal to 1). Definition 3. Adding hyperconnections' inputs. The Add À operation is an element-wise vector addition that adds the elements of two or more hyperconnections. When H i denotes the set of indices of all physical node that have a hyperconnection to the physical node v i , the Add operation at node v i computes a vector by adding the data going through the incoming hyperconnections j P H i as
where x ji is the vector passing through the hyperconnection connecting the physical node v j to the physical node v i . Since, in this paper, w i j " 1, we will have
We represent the vector output of a failed physical node i.e. null vector, by the symbol Φ. Formally, when a null vector is added to a non-null vector, the null vector is ignored. That is, x i j À Φ " x i j . In the case where all source physical nodes of the incoming hyperconnections to a physical node fail, we will have Φ À . . . À Φ " Φ, which means the input of the physical node will be the null vector. Since in this case, applying operations on the null vector is meaningless, the physical node outputs the null vector Φ. If the null vector is propagated all the way through the last layer of DNN, which means the information flow did not make it to the last layer, random guessing is performed.
Hyperconnection Dimensions: The Add operation requires that the dimensions of the operands be the same. However, the dimensions of the hyperconnections are not always the same, as they connect layers of DNN in different depths. When it is necessary to change the dimension of the vectors, we perform zero-padding to match the vector with the largest dimension. The vector with the largest dimension also decides the dimension (number of units) of the expansion layer.
Expansion Layer: A special layer called the expansion layer is added to a physical node for the reception of the input vector from the Add operation (x pl # i q ) and its expansion to the first layer units of the physical node. The values of the Add operation output vector are sent to the corresponding units in the expansion layer. Hence, each unit in the expansion layer has only one input, the corresponding value in the input vector, and the identity activation function дpxq " x. Thus, the number of the units in the expansion layer should be equal to the number of elements in the output vector of the Add operation, which is the maximum among the dimensions of the added vectors going through hyperconnections.
Modeling Resiliency for Distributed DNN
In this subsection, we construct a metric based on accuracy for modeling the resiliency for distributed DNNs. To do so, we introduce some definitions.
We consider a set of n physical nodes V " tv 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n u over which a DNN is distributed according to the partition map u. Definition 4. Survivability setting of the physical nodes in V , is an n-tuple S V " ps 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n q P r0, 1s n , where each element s i is the probability that the physical node v i P V survives at inference time. s i is referred to as survivability and s i " p1´p i q, where p i P r0, 1s is the probability that the physical node v i P V fails during inference time.
In order to model the survivability of a given distributed DNN, we need to model the following: (I) the physical nodes failing simultaneously during the inference time; and (II) the probability of a given simultaneous failure. To model (I), we introduce node failure combination, which is the combination of the physical nodes that fail simultaneously during the inference time.
Definition 5. A node failure combination of the physical nodes in V , is an n-tuple B V " pb 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n q P t0, 1u n , in which each element b i is a binary value indicating if the v i P V has failed (0) or not (1) .
We now have a model for (I), through B V . Since, at inference time, a physical node v i P V can either fail or survive and since |V | " n, there are 2 n possible node failure combinations (multiple physical nodes can fail at the same time).
To model (II), we introduce ppB V |S V q, the probability of occurrence of a certain node failure combination B V during inference time, given a survivability setting S V over physical nodes V . This probability can be calculated as:
As a numerical example, assume that a network has four physical nodes and survivability setting is S V " p0.98, 0.98, 0.95, 0.94q. The probability of the node failure combination where node 4 fails (B V " p1, 1, 1, 0q) is ppB V |S V q " 0.98ˆ0.98ˆ0.95ˆ0.06 " 0.0547428.
Now we have a model for survivability of distributed DNNs. Next, we need to define a new notation ∅, necessary to model the resiliency of a distributed DNN: Definition 6. Operator ∅. Given a node failure combination B V , the notation G V ∅B V represents the distributed DNN G V (over physical nodes V ), in which those units that reside on B V 's failing physical nodes are failed.
Average Accuracy as Resiliency Measure: For modeling the resiliency of distributed DNNs, performance indicators such as accuracy, precision, or recall may be used. In this paper, we use average accuracy as the measure of resiliency.
The average accuracy of a distributed DNN G V over physical nodes V against survivability setting S V during inference is
where ApG V ∅B V q is the accuracy of G V ∅B V during inference, and ppB V |S V q is the probability of node failure combination B V given a survivability setting S V . Equation (5) calculates the weighted average of accuracy over all possible node failure combinations (weighed by ppB V |S V q).
DEEPFOGGUARD DESIGN
Distributed DNNs cannot be considered intrinsically failure-resilient without a proper design. Conventionally, we refer to the distributed DNNs that are not trained for failure resiliency as Vanilla. deepFogGuard's goal is to increase ApG V , S V q, the average accuracy of the distributed DNN G V , against a given survivability setting S V . We tend towards passive resiliency, the ability to function in the presence of failure without any re-training or reacting, but by exploiting the intrinsic resiliency [30] . To accomplish this, we consider and experiment with a method that augments the training process with built-in resiliency: adding skip hyperconnections to the architecture of a distributed DNN. Skip hyperconnections inherently increase the resiliency of the underlying neural architecture.
Resiliency via Skip Hyperconnections
The concept of skip hyperconnections is similar to residual connections. DNNs with residual connections are easier to optimize and have been shown to implicitly deal with the exploding gradient problem, ultimately providing better performance than standard DNNs [13] . Inspired by residual connections in DNNs, in deepFogGuard we add skip hyperconnection between physical nodes to provide additional pathways for the flow of information through the model, even in the presence of partial failures. This is to thwart the no-information-flow situation, in which the information does not make it to the last layer of the DNN, and random guessing has to be performed. Figure 2 depicts the architecture of our experiments, discussed in Section 4. The dashed arrows represent skip hyperconnections between physical nodes. In the architecture on the right in Fig. 2 , all seven skip hyperconnections that skip one physical node are present. Similarly, all the three skip hyperconnections that skip one physical node are present in the distributed DNN on the left in Fig. 2 . Generally, more skip hyperconnections improve resiliency, especially in more extreme failure scenarios in which multiple physical nodes can fail at the same time.
Implementation Notes: (1) Skip hyperconnection can be implemented via TCP connections. (2) When implementing the Add operation, one has to ensure that the failure of a physical node does not result in an interruption, e.g. when a TCP socket exception is thrown. (3) Physical nodes are responsible for keeping track of the status of the hyperconnections' respective source nodes from which they are fed. This can be done through a simple ping (keep alive) mechanism. (4) Inference should be implemented in a synchronized fashion, that is, if a physical node fails and its output is not present, the null vector Φ should be used as the data.
EXPERIMENTS 4.1 Datasets
Our extensive experiments are conducted using two existing datasets for the state-of-the-art sensing and vision applications, explained as follows.
Health Activity Classification ("Health"): We utilize the mobile health activity sensor dataset (UCI MHealth [3] ) as a benchmark for failure resiliency of a vertically distributed DNN (see Fig. 2a ). The dataset is comprised of readings from various sensors placed on different body parts of patients. This dataset is an example of an IoT application for medical purposes. The dataset contains sensor acceleration data from three different sensors placed at the chest, left ankle, and right arm. Additionally, the left ankle and right arm sensor provide body orientation data, and the chest sensors provide ECG measurements. The dataset is labeled with the 12 activities a patient is performing at a given time, and the task is to classify the type of activity (e.g. if the patient is sitting or running). There are a total of 23 features, where each feature corresponds to a specific type of data collected from one of the three sensors across ten human test subjects. For this experiment, the activities that do not belong to one of the 12 classes are removed, resulting in a dataset of 343,185 data points. The health activity classification dataset is approximately uniformly distributed across each class after preprocessing, and hence we use a standard cross-entropy loss function for the classification.
Multi-Camera Object Classification ("Camera"): The multiview object detection dataset [24] is used as a benchmark for failure resiliency in DNNs that are distributed both vertically and horizontally (see Fig. 2b ). The dataset contains videos of a street from six different viewpoints, with object bounding boxes for frames captured from each camera. The bounding boxes are placed around three classes of objects: pedestrians, cars, and buses. Each camera is an IoT node, providing a viewpoint to the cloud for inference.
We crop the images to the bounding boxes to obtain (potentially) six different viewpoints for each object. We then center and resize each image to 32ˆ32ˆ3 pixels, keeping the RGB channels. For views in which a particular object is obscured (and therefore does not exist in the object bounding box list), we generate an empty (black) image [29] . A single data instance is then a collection of six images of an object from the six cameras, and an associated label.
In total, the dataset contains around 1,400 data points. Since the distribution of the classes is skewed towards the "car" class, we utilize weighted (i.e. cost-sensitive) cross-entropy loss to incur a higher penalty for incorrectly predicting any given data point to be car [12] . Although the dataset contains very few images for the bus class, we keep it as one of the classes.
For both experiments, we separate each dataset into train, validation, and test with an 80/10/10 split. We use the validation set to select the best model among different training epochs. We run the model for many training epochs, select the model with highest validation accuracy, and report its accuracy on the test set, which the DNN has never seen.
Experiment Setup
We implemented our experiments on Google Cloud using TensorFlow and Keras. In order to assess the performance of our proposed method on different architectures of distributed DNNs, we propose separate model configurations for each experiment. For the health activity classification experiment (Fig. 2a) , we consider a vertically distributed DNN that consists of ten hidden layers of width 250. The DNN layers are partitioned into four physical nodes (an edge node, two fog nodes, and a cloud node). The edge node contains one layer, the first fog node two, the second fog node three, and the cloud node four hidden layers. Conversely, for the multi-camera object classification experiment (Fig. 2b) we consider a DNN consisting of 14 layers of width 32 that are distributed both vertically and horizontally. The hidden layers are partitioned into nine physical nodes (four edge nodes, four fog nodes, and a cloud node). Images from the six individual cameras are merged using element-wise addition. We designed this highly distributed DNN architecture for the multi-camera object classification experiment, since it represents a very general architecture, where the DNN is distributed vertically and horizontally and is also asymmetric.
In our experiments, we only include the skip hyperconnections that skip one physical node, since, in the edge-fog-cloud hierarchy, the number of physical nodes over which the DNN is distributed is not large. Moreover, we experimented with models having skip hyperconnections that skip more than one physical node, but did not observe any performance gain.
Each of the aforementioned models is trained via stochastic gradient descent using the Adam optimizer [16] . Batch sizes of 1024 and 64, and the learning rates of 0.001 and 0.1 are used for the health activity classification and multi-camera object classification experiments, respectively.
We propose three different survivability settings outlined in Table 1 : the setting Normal indicates reasonable network survivabilities while the settings Poor and Hazardous represent survivability settings (only for the sake of our experiments) when the failures are very frequent in the network. We also have the survivability setting No Failure, in which all survivabilities are simply set to 1. The failure probabilities of fog nodes and edge nodes in both experiments are described in Table 1 . Fog nodes are denoted with f i and edge nodes with e i . We assume that the cloud node is always available and does not fail. If IoT nodes fail, the distributed DNNs will have no input, and random guessing must be performed. Since we are studying the resiliency of distributed DNNs (and not their input), we did not consider the failure of IoT nodes. Fig. 3 shows the average accuracy of deepFogGuard and Vanilla for each experiment under different survivability settings over 10 runs (ApG V , S V q). We can see that deepFogGuard is successful in In the health activity classification experiment (Fig. 3a) , in the Hazardous survivability setting, deepFogGuard increases average accuracy by almost 20%, relative to the baseline Vanilla. Similarly, in the Poor survivability setting, the average accuracy of deepFogGuard is around 10% higher than that of Vanilla. This difference in accuracy decreases when the survivability of the network is higher (e.g. in Normal or No Failure). Vanilla's poor performance under physical node failure is an indication of the inaccessibility of a path for information flow, hence the occurrence of random guessing for the classification task.
Results
In the multi-camera object classification experiment, we observe the same trends as in the health activity classification experiment. Since the architecture of the DNNs is highly distributed (vertically and horizontally) in this experiment, even Vanilla can perform well (above 81%). This is because Vanilla's distributed DNN architecture still receives partial data in certain cases of failure. For instance, there are built-in redundancies among cameras, edge nodes, and fog nodes 3 and 4. This is not true for Vanilla in the health activity classification experiment, in which the distributed DNN is only vertically partitioned. Similar to the health activity classification experiment, we see the largest improvement in the Hazardous survivability setting, although deepFogGuard outperforms Vanilla across the board, in both experiments, under various survivability settings.
This concludes the discussion of our experiments. In the next section, we explain the state of the art in this direction, and we position our work's novelty in the literature. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the limitations and opportunities to improve deepFogGuard.
RELATED WORK
The related work in this space can be categorized as follows.
a. Distributed training. Training of distributed DNNs has received significant attention from both academia and industry. Some examples include distributed training frameworks from Google [1] , Facebook [22] , Microsoft [7] , and Uber [26] . Distributed training of DNNs across edge nodes is studied in [31] (non-resilient) and [5, 8] (resilient against adversaries). Nevertheless, inference in distributed DNNs is less explored. Recently, some IoT application scenarios have emerged that need ongoing and long inference tasks [9, 14, 18, 20, 28, 29] . In line with this direction, we study inference of distributed DNNs, but different from it, we consider failure resiliency.
b. DNN Partitioning. DNN partitioning frameworks consider several factors to find the best partition map to split and distribute a DNN [9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 32, 35] . These frameworks can be used to provide input (partitioned distributed DNN) to deepFogGuard, from which resilient distributed DNN for inference is extracted.
c. DNN Fault Tolerance. In the DNN literature, a concept related to failure is fault, which is when units or weights become defective (i.e. stuck at a certain value, random bit flip, weight fault, or short circuit) [30] . Studies on fault tolerance of neural networks date back to the early 90s and are limited to mathematical models with simplistic assumptions (e.g. neural networks with one hidden layer, unit-only and weight-only faults, or sigmoid-only neural networks) [4, 19, 23] . However, none of these works consider the failure of physical nodes that potentially cause the failure of a large group of DNN units and weights.
d. DNN Failure Robustness and Resiliency. Some early works study the resiliency of non-distributed DNNs against single or multiple unit failures [25, 36] . More recently, the authors of [10] provide theoretical definitions and bounds for the failure of elements in non-distributed DNNs. Contrary to previous works, this paper studies resiliency of distributed DNN inference in the presence of failure of a large group of DNN units.
CONCLUSION
We presented deepFogGuard, a method for failure resiliency of distributed DNN inference. We confirmed through experiments that skip hyperconnections increase the resiliency of distributed DNNs. deepFogGuard has a few limitations and opportunities for improvement, which we discuss below.
Limitations: While deepFogGuard improves resiliency by sending the data along redundant paths, it also inevitably consumes additional bandwidth when there are no failures. Moreover, keeping multiple TCP connections active and checking the status of other physical nodes consumes resources.
Future Work: This study opens many related research opportunities. Firstly, it is interesting to see how deepFogGuard can be extended to other types of neural networks, such as convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and recurrent neural networks (RNNs). Furthermore, regularization or methods that implicitly increase robustness, such as dropout, may improve the resiliency even more. Finally, one could consider changing the weights of the remaining hyperconnections after the failure of the physical nodes to account for the change in relative input scale of the physical node.
